image-to-video

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to invoke the runcomfy command-line utility. It uses a structured approach, passing user inputs such as prompts and URLs within a JSON object to the CLI's --input flag. The documentation notes that this method is intended to prevent shell injection by avoiding direct shell expansion of the prompt content.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation requires the installation of the @runcomfy/cli package from the public NPM registry. It also describes the CLI's behavior of downloading generated video files from vendor-specific domains (runcomfy.net and runcomfy.com) to a user-specified output directory. These activities are consistent with the skill's stated purpose of interacting with the RunComfy service.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: As the skill is designed to process untrusted user-supplied data—including text prompts and external media URLs—it presents a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks at the model layer.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided inputs are accepted for image_url, video_url, audio_url, and prompt fields as detailed in SKILL.md routes.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses JSON encapsulation as a boundary between the user-supplied string and the shell command execution.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities for shell command execution (runcomfy), network access (handled by the CLI), and file system writes (via the --output-dir parameter).
  • Sanitization: The instructions rely on JSON stringification provided by the agent's execution environment to escape potentially malicious characters before they are passed to the CLI.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 16, 2026, 11:57 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — image-to-video