agent-relay
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on multiple Bash scripts (
setup.sh,session-start.sh,prompt-inbox.sh,stop-inbox.sh) to perform installation, manage local state in~/.relay, and interact with the Relaycast API. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The MCP server configuration in
codex-config/config.tomlusesnpx -y agent-relay mcpto fetch and execute theagent-relaypackage from the public NPM registry at runtime. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
hooks/prompt-inbox.shscript periodically polls an external API and injects received messages into theUserPromptSubmithook context, which could allow external actors to influence agent behavior. - Ingestion points: External messages are fetched via
curlfromapi.relaycast.devinhooks/prompt-inbox.sh. - Boundary markers: Messages are injected into the context with a text header but lack robust delimiters or specific instructions to the model to treat the content as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides access to Relaycast MCP tools for messaging, agent registration, and worker spawning.
- Sanitization: The
hooks/prompt-inbox.shscript replaces newlines in message text with spaces, but no semantic filtering or instruction sanitization is performed. - [PERSISTENCE]: The
scripts/setup.shscript automatically modifies the agent's.codex/hooks.jsonfile to register scripts that run on every session start, prompt submission, and agent exit, ensuring a persistent presence in the agent's runtime environment.
Audit Metadata