agent-relay

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on multiple Bash scripts (setup.sh, session-start.sh, prompt-inbox.sh, stop-inbox.sh) to perform installation, manage local state in ~/.relay, and interact with the Relaycast API.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The MCP server configuration in codex-config/config.toml uses npx -y agent-relay mcp to fetch and execute the agent-relay package from the public NPM registry at runtime.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The hooks/prompt-inbox.sh script periodically polls an external API and injects received messages into the UserPromptSubmit hook context, which could allow external actors to influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: External messages are fetched via curl from api.relaycast.dev in hooks/prompt-inbox.sh.
  • Boundary markers: Messages are injected into the context with a text header but lack robust delimiters or specific instructions to the model to treat the content as untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill provides access to Relaycast MCP tools for messaging, agent registration, and worker spawning.
  • Sanitization: The hooks/prompt-inbox.sh script replaces newlines in message text with spaces, but no semantic filtering or instruction sanitization is performed.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The scripts/setup.sh script automatically modifies the agent's .codex/hooks.json file to register scripts that run on every session start, prompt submission, and agent exit, ensuring a persistent presence in the agent's runtime environment.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 5, 2026, 04:58 AM