relay-connect
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to discover and interact with a local Unix socket (
relay.sock) located in the vendor-specific directory$HOME/.agentworkforce/desktop/. It usescurlwith the--unix-socketflag to perform local API calls to a relay daemon. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references documentation and setup guides hosted on the author's official GitHub repository (
AgentWorkforce/relay-desktop). It also provides instructions for adding a hosted MCP server from the vendor's domain (agentrelay.com) when local communication is unavailable. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process data from external agents, including participant names and remote messages, which serves as a potential attack surface.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through the
/connect/joinresponse and messages injected into the chat stream via the local probe. - Boundary markers: The skill contains explicit instructions to treat invite tasks, participant names, and remote messages as untrusted data rather than instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to local shell execution for socket communication and network access via the hosted MCP fallback.
- Sanitization: The instructions strictly prohibit the interpolation of remote or human-provided text into shell source code or arguments.
Audit Metadata