setting-up-agent-relay-sessions
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to read content from teammates' live sessions, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data from external agents is ingested via tools such as
read_relay_conversation,get_shared_session_context, andcheck_relay_inbox(documented inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded in the shared session data.
- Capability inventory: The agent is granted shell access, allowing it to execute commands (
curl,mkdir,install,npx) and write to the file system (~/.codex/skills/). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the remote session content is performed before the agent processes it.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads and installs external packages and other skills during the setup process.
- Evidence: It uses
npx prpm installto fetch@agent-relay/packages andnpx skills addto fetch skills fromgithub.com/AgentWorkforce/skills. - Note: These resources belong to the skill's author (
agentworkforce) or the official service domain (agentrelay.com), representing standard vendor functionality. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous shell commands for the agent to execute to verify the environment, install software, and configure MCP servers.
- Evidence: Shell blocks in
SKILL.mdinclude commands for session verification (uname,test -S), file mirroring (mkdir,install,cmp), and MCP management (claude mcp add).
Audit Metadata