setting-up-agent-relay-sessions

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to read content from teammates' live sessions, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data from external agents is ingested via tools such as read_relay_conversation, get_shared_session_context, and check_relay_inbox (documented in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded in the shared session data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent is granted shell access, allowing it to execute commands (curl, mkdir, install, npx) and write to the file system (~/.codex/skills/).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the remote session content is performed before the agent processes it.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads and installs external packages and other skills during the setup process.
  • Evidence: It uses npx prpm install to fetch @agent-relay/ packages and npx skills add to fetch skills from github.com/AgentWorkforce/skills.
  • Note: These resources belong to the skill's author (agentworkforce) or the official service domain (agentrelay.com), representing standard vendor functionality.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous shell commands for the agent to execute to verify the environment, install software, and configure MCP servers.
  • Evidence: Shell blocks in SKILL.md include commands for session verification (uname, test -S), file mirroring (mkdir, install, cmp), and MCP management (claude mcp add).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 15, 2026, 12:10 AM