setting-up-relayfile

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructions manage authentication credentials by storing and reading tokens from local paths such as ~/.relayfile/credentials.json and ~/.relayfile/cloud-credentials.json.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions rely on various shell commands (relayfile, curl, jq, daytona) to configure the environment, start background mount daemons, and diagnose failures.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Provides examples of reading local authentication tokens using jq and transmitting them to the agentrelay.com domain via curl headers to facilitate session connectivity.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a surface for indirect prompt injection by mounting untrusted content from external providers (e.g., Slack, Notion) into the agent's filesystem.
  • Ingestion points: Files located in the ~/relayfile-mount/ directory, which mirrors data from third-party services.
  • Boundary markers: There are no instructions for implementing boundary markers or "ignore" directives for the data synced from external providers.
  • Capability inventory: Includes the relayfile CLI toolset, network operations via curl, and shell command execution via tools like daytona.
  • Sanitization: No specific filtering or sanitization steps are documented for the content being read from external providers.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 15, 2026, 10:33 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — setting-up-relayfile