setting-up-relayfile
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructions manage authentication credentials by storing and reading tokens from local paths such as
~/.relayfile/credentials.jsonand~/.relayfile/cloud-credentials.json. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions rely on various shell commands (
relayfile,curl,jq,daytona) to configure the environment, start background mount daemons, and diagnose failures. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Provides examples of reading local authentication tokens using
jqand transmitting them to theagentrelay.comdomain viacurlheaders to facilitate session connectivity. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a surface for indirect prompt injection by mounting untrusted content from external providers (e.g., Slack, Notion) into the agent's filesystem.
- Ingestion points: Files located in the
~/relayfile-mount/directory, which mirrors data from third-party services. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions for implementing boundary markers or "ignore" directives for the data synced from external providers.
- Capability inventory: Includes the
relayfileCLI toolset, network operations viacurl, and shell command execution via tools likedaytona. - Sanitization: No specific filtering or sanitization steps are documented for the content being read from external providers.
Audit Metadata