rageprompt
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs extensive scans of local directories where AI chat histories are stored, including
~/.claude,~/.codex,~/.gemini,~/.continue, and various IDE storage paths (Cursor, Windsurf, Trae). - Chat logs are sensitive files that often contain proprietary code and personal information.
- The
scripts/submit-result.mjsscript uploads the selected "winning" prompt to a remote server (https://rageprompt.com/api/leaderboard). - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The scripts specifically target files that are known to contain secrets. While basic redaction logic is included for common API key formats (sk-..., ghp_...), it is not exhaustive and may fail to mask all sensitive credentials or tokens present in the chat history.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
collect-history.mjsscript executes thesqlite3system command to extract data from local application databases. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes and "judges" untrusted content from chat logs. Instructions embedded in those logs could potentially influence the agent's behavior during the judging phase.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata