skills/agoodway/goodstack/gs-why/Gen Agent Trust Hub

gs-why

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 20, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from multiple external sources which may contain embedded instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Data is ingested from Git commit history, Pull Request descriptions and comments, issue trackers (Linear, Jira), long-form documents (Notion, Confluence), team chat (Slack), and observability platforms (Datadog, Sentry).
  • Boundary markers: The prompt templates in investigator-prompt.md and synthesizer-prompt.md use markdown headers and sections like > {QUESTION} to separate instructions from data, but they lack explicit warnings for the model to ignore embedded instructions within the retrieved content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to execute shell commands and call various MCP-based tools to fetch and query data.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of explicit sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from external sources before it is processed by the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and executes shell commands to interact with the project's version control and host platform.
  • Evidence: Instructions in SKILL.md and references/sources/code-archaeology.md direct the agent to run commands such as git blame, git log, gh pr view, and glab mr view using parameters derived from the conversation or repository metadata.
  • Context: These commands are fundamental to the skill's purpose and use well-known CLI tools to retrieve information from legitimate service providers.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 20, 2026, 09:35 AM