anti-slop-brain
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The file
anti_slop_brain/cli.pycontains calls tosubprocess.call()to execute internal scripts from thescripts/directory. These calls are defensive, using the current Python executable (sys.executable) and passing arguments as a list rather than a single string, which prevents shell injection vulnerabilities. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides a surface for indirect prompt injection. (1) Ingestion point: untrusted data enters context via
scripts/ingest_source.py(triggered by theingestcommand). (2) Boundary markers: absent in the provided CLI code; metadata instructions rely on YAML structure. (3) Capability inventory: internal script execution viasubprocess.callinanti_slop_brain/cli.py. (4) Sanitization: absent in the provided CLI wrapper. The risk is mitigated by strong behavioral guardrails inagents/anti-slop-secretary.mdandwiki/meta/CONVENTIONS.mdthat mandate citation and grounding in verified vault notes. - [SAFE]: The project demonstrates excellent security hygiene, including a comprehensive security policy (
SECURITY.md), publishing guidelines (PUBLISHING_NOTICE.md) that explicitly forbid the storage of credentials, and release checks (RELEASE_CHECKLIST.md) that verify the absence of secrets and local absolute paths. - [SAFE]: According to the documentation and third-party notices, the skill relies solely on the Python standard library for its runtime operations, which significantly reduces supply chain risks.
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