anti-slop-brain

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The file anti_slop_brain/cli.py contains calls to subprocess.call() to execute internal scripts from the scripts/ directory. These calls are defensive, using the current Python executable (sys.executable) and passing arguments as a list rather than a single string, which prevents shell injection vulnerabilities.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides a surface for indirect prompt injection. (1) Ingestion point: untrusted data enters context via scripts/ingest_source.py (triggered by the ingest command). (2) Boundary markers: absent in the provided CLI code; metadata instructions rely on YAML structure. (3) Capability inventory: internal script execution via subprocess.call in anti_slop_brain/cli.py. (4) Sanitization: absent in the provided CLI wrapper. The risk is mitigated by strong behavioral guardrails in agents/anti-slop-secretary.md and wiki/meta/CONVENTIONS.md that mandate citation and grounding in verified vault notes.
  • [SAFE]: The project demonstrates excellent security hygiene, including a comprehensive security policy (SECURITY.md), publishing guidelines (PUBLISHING_NOTICE.md) that explicitly forbid the storage of credentials, and release checks (RELEASE_CHECKLIST.md) that verify the absence of secrets and local absolute paths.
  • [SAFE]: According to the documentation and third-party notices, the skill relies solely on the Python standard library for its runtime operations, which significantly reduces supply chain risks.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 11, 2026, 03:44 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — anti-slop-brain