ads
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through the brand DNA extraction feature. The
/ads dna <url>command crawls external websites to extract brand voice and visual style data, which is then stored inbrand-profile.json. This data is subsequently used by thecreative-strategistandvisual-designeragents to generate campaign copy and images. An attacker could place malicious instructions on a website to influence these downstream AI processes.\n - Ingestion points: External website content is fetched via the
ads-dnacommand as documented inSKILL.mdandreferences/brand-dna-template.md.\n - Boundary markers: There are no specified delimiters or instructions for the agents to ignore potential commands embedded within the extracted website content.\n
- Capability inventory: The extracted brand profile influences campaign planning (
ads-create) and AI image generation (ads-generateusinggenerate_image.py).\n - Sanitization: The skill lacks mentioned sanitization or validation logic for the content retrieved from external URLs.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documents requirements for several well-known third-party libraries used for image generation tasks. Evidence:
openai>=1.75.0,stability-sdk>=0.8.4,replicate>=1.0.4.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local scripts and orchestrates specialized agents to perform audits and creative generation. Evidence: Usage ofgenerate_image.pyfor visual asset creation and theTasktool for subagent delegation.
Audit Metadata