blog-flow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/sync_flow.pyexecutes a local system command viasubprocess.runto callgh auth tokenfor optional GitHub authentication. This invocation is securely structured as a hardcoded sequence of arguments with no shell evaluation or user-controlled variable interpolation, preventing command injection vulnerabilities. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection since it is designed to ingest and evaluate text or data from external URLs or topics specified by the user.
- Ingestion points: Content from user-provided topics or retrieved target URLs processed across commands like
/blog flow findand/blog flow optimize. - Boundary markers: The prompts utilize simple brackets such as
[ARTICLE, HUB, OR SITE]to position inputs but do not implement strict semantic boundaries or instructions to ignore nested commands. - Capability inventory: The overall workspace possesses file writing and network retrieval capabilities restricted to the repository's synchronization logic.
- Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization or filtering applied to incoming text inputs before being passed into the language model context.
Audit Metadata