blog-flow

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/sync_flow.py executes a local system command via subprocess.run to call gh auth token for optional GitHub authentication. This invocation is securely structured as a hardcoded sequence of arguments with no shell evaluation or user-controlled variable interpolation, preventing command injection vulnerabilities.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection since it is designed to ingest and evaluate text or data from external URLs or topics specified by the user.
  • Ingestion points: Content from user-provided topics or retrieved target URLs processed across commands like /blog flow find and /blog flow optimize.
  • Boundary markers: The prompts utilize simple brackets such as [ARTICLE, HUB, OR SITE] to position inputs but do not implement strict semantic boundaries or instructions to ignore nested commands.
  • Capability inventory: The overall workspace possesses file writing and network retrieval capabilities restricted to the repository's synchronization logic.
  • Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization or filtering applied to incoming text inputs before being passed into the language model context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 04:57 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — blog-flow