blog-notebooklm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's setup process installs the Google Chrome browser via the
patchrightlibrary to facilitate browser automation. This is a functional requirement for interacting with the NotebookLM web interface. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runto manage its internal environment, install dependencies from a locked requirements file, and execute its own management scripts. These operations are restricted to the skill's local directory and managed virtual environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external notebooks which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Content is scraped from the Google Notebook web interface in
ask_question.pyandbrowser_session.py. - Boundary markers: The skill explicitly identifies answers as "untrusted text" and provides clear instructions to the agent to treat the content as data and ignore any embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has permissions for network access (to Google domains) and local file writes (for library management and session state).
- Sanitization: The skill separates retrieved data from the agent's control logic using distinct response fields and reminder strings (
FOLLOW_UP_REMINDER). - [CREDENTIALS_SAFE]: The skill handles Google authentication through a manual login process in a visible browser. Session tokens and cookies are stored locally in the
data/directory. Access is secured using POSIX-style restrictive permissions (0o600for files and0o700for directories) to prevent unauthorized local access.
Audit Metadata