blog-translate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONNO_CODE
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted external blog content (Markdown, MDX, HTML), which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection. A source file containing malicious instructions could potentially influence the agent's behavior during the translation process.\n
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdPhase 1 describes reading source files provided by the user.\n - Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not specify the use of delimiters (e.g., XML tags or triple quotes) or explicit warnings for the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the source content.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill performs file read and write operations on the local filesystem (
SKILL.mdPhase 1 and Phase 5).\n - Sanitization: Absent; the skill includes checks for translation quality and artifacts but lacks mechanisms to detect or sanitize malicious prompt injection payloads within the input text.
Audit Metadata