email-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow instructs the agent to execute a shell command with user-supplied content by directly interpolating the email subject into a command string:
python scripts/score_subject_line.py --subject "[subject]". If an email subject line contains shell metacharacters like semicolons, backticks, or command substitutions, this can lead to arbitrary command execution on the host platform. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill operates on untrusted external data which can contain hidden instructions or malicious payloads designed to manipulate the agent or underlying system.
- Ingestion points: Ingests untrusted third-party email data (subject line, body copy, raw HTML, file paths, and Gmail drafts) in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or explicit instructions to prevent the model from following commands embedded inside the email content.
- Capability inventory: Uses the
Bashtool to run local scripts (scripts/score_subject_line.pyandscripts/analyze_email_html.py) and interacts with Gmail via MCP tools (gmail_get_draft,gmail_send_message). - Sanitization: Absent. No filtering, validation, or shell escaping mechanisms are defined before data interpolation or text analysis.
Audit Metadata