claude-video-download
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
Bashtool to executeyt-dlpcommands with user-supplied arguments. - Evidence: Multiple instruction blocks in
SKILL.mddemonstrate executing commands likeyt-dlp -F "URL"andyt-dlp -o "%(title)s.%(ext)s" "URL". - Risk: If the user provides a URL containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,
;,&&,$()), it could lead to arbitrary command execution if the agent does not properly escape the input. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's primary purpose is to download media content from external servers.
- Evidence: Explicitly supports downloads from YouTube, Vimeo, Twitter, TikTok, and other platforms using
yt-dlp. - Context: This behavior is the stated primary purpose of the skill.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection via the processing of untrusted URLs.
- Ingestion points: The
URLandPLAYLIST_URLparameters inSKILL.mdact as entry points for untrusted data into the shell environment. - Boundary markers: While the examples use double quotes around the
URLplaceholder, this does not prevent all forms of command substitution in a shell context. - Capability inventory: The skill is granted
Bashtool access, which can be misused if input is injected into commands. - Sanitization: There are no explicit instructions for the agent to validate or sanitize the URL format or content before passing it to the
Bashtool.
Audit Metadata