claude-video-enhance-audio
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell variables like
$INPUTand$OUTPUTdirectly withinBashtool blocks (e.g.,python3 scripts/audio_enhance.py separate "$INPUT"). While the use of double quotes provides some protection, this pattern remains a potential surface for command injection if input filenames contain sophisticated shell metacharacters or if the agent environment performs unsafe expansion. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: This skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8). It processes untrusted audio/video files to generate transcripts and speaker labels (via WhisperX and pyannote-audio).
- Ingestion points: External media files provided as
$INPUTinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None identified. The transcript output is processed by the agent without explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bash,Read, andWritetools, allowing for command execution and file system modification. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or filtering of the generated transcript text before it is returned to the agent context.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructions suggest passing sensitive API tokens (HuggingFace, ElevenLabs, OpenAI) via command-line flags (e.g.,
--hf-token TOKEN). This is a sub-optimal security practice as it may expose credentials in process lists or shell history logs, although the skill also correctly mentions the use of environment variables.
Audit Metadata