seo-flow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill defines a
/seo flow synccommand intended to execute a Python script (scripts/sync_flow.py) for updating the framework's prompt library. It should be noted that the target script is not present in the provided file package, suggesting a dependency on external or environment-provided code. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The framework is designed to synchronize and pull content from the author's GitHub repository (
github.com/AgriciDaniel/flow). This represents a standard update mechanism leveraging the vendor's own infrastructure. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external URLs and topical data through its prompt library, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions in audited content could attempt to influence the agent.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context via the
[url|topic]arguments in the stage-specific commands (find, leverage, optimize, win, local) defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The prompt templates include explicit constraints instructing the agent to "Use only the supplied inputs" and "clearly label any assumption," which serve as behavioral controls against embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to write audit summaries to a local data cache (
.seo-cache/) and to execute the synchronization script. - Sanitization: The skill relies primarily on model-level instructions within the prompts rather than explicit programmatic validation or sanitization of the external content.
Audit Metadata