project-onboarding
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes content from third-party instruction files and search results, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Reads
SKILL.mdfiles of installed skills to extract metadata and parses output fromnpx skills find. - Boundary markers: Does not use specific delimiters to isolate external text, relying instead on the agent's adherence to the audit policy in
references/security-filter.md. - Capability inventory: Accesses
Bashfor installation andWrite/Editfor updating project routing files likeAGENTS.md. - Sanitization: Uses a logical security filter to identify and block malicious patterns in external skills before installation.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Shell commands are built at runtime using identifiers obtained from an external registry search.
- Evidence: The skill generates commands such as
npx skills add <owner/repo> --skill <skill-name>where placeholders are filled from dynamic search results. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's primary function is to download and install external code components (agent skills) from a remote registry.
- Evidence: Explicitly uses
npx skills addto fetch resources from theskills.shecosystem. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Uses local PowerShell and Bash scripts to scan the project environment.
- Evidence: Executes
./assets/detect-stack.ps1and./assets/detect-stack.shto determine the project's technology stack.
Audit Metadata