job-application-assistant
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill recognizes job postings and company websites as untrusted third-party data. It implements a mandatory sanitization workflow using
tools/posting_guard.pyto remove hidden text, invisible styling, and malicious instructions before the LLM processes the content. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: A strict trust boundary is enforced in
09-web-research.md, explicitly forbidding the agent from following URLs found within a posting's body or following directions embedded in fetched content. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves executing local Python utilities (
tools/fetch_page.py,tools/robots_check.py,tools/verify_pdf.py,salary_lookup.py) and LaTeX typesetting engines (lualatex,xelatex) to automate research and document creation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Cross-skill tool invocation is used to interact with job portal APIs (e.g.,
bun run .agents/skills/<portal-skill>/cli/src/cli.ts) which provides a safer, authenticated alternative to general web fetching. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill manages highly sensitive Personal Identifiable Information (PII) in
01-candidate-profile.mdand02-behavioral-profile.md. This data is handled locally to tailor application materials and is protected by the aforementioned web research trust boundaries that prevent unauthorized exfiltration to untrusted domains. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Document generation via LaTeX templates includes mandatory instructions to escape special characters (e.g.,
&,%,$,#) in user-provided or externally sourced strings, mitigating LaTeX injection and potential command execution vulnerabilities within the typesetting engine. - [SAFE]: Web research follows a responsible escalation order, including a mandatory check of
robots.txtviatools/robots_check.pybefore retrying fetches with browser headers.
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