content-digest
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands using
yt-dlpand a Python script (fetch_tweet.py) with user-provided URLs interpolated directly into the command string ("{URL}"). This pattern is vulnerable to command injection if the URL contains shell metacharacters that bypass the double-quoting. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external sources including YouTube transcripts, X/Twitter posts, webpages, and PDF files to generate summaries and interactive quizzes.
- Ingestion points: Content is fetched from arbitrary URLs via
yt-dlp, a Python scraper script, a headless browser (mcp__claude-in-chrome), and the fileReadtool. - Boundary markers: The instructions for the subagent (
Phase 2-1) do not include specific delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded in the source content, allowing potential instruction override. - Capability inventory: The skill has access to
WebSearch, file system writing (research/digests/), shell execution, and subagent instantiation. - Sanitization: Content cleaning focuses on removing timestamps and formatting for transcript clarity, but does not perform security-focused sanitization to prevent injection attacks.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The YouTube extraction instructions mention the optional use of the
--cookies-from-browser chromeflag foryt-dlp. This allows the tool to access sensitive browser session data and authentication cookies, which could be exposed or misused in a shared environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs automated network requests to fetch content from various user-provided domains and performs automated web research based on extracted keywords, interacting with arbitrary remote servers.
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