team-assemble

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's instructions in SKILL.md and its working examples utilize the Task tool with a specifically defined mode: "bypassPermissions" parameter. This configuration allows sub-agents (teammates) to execute their assigned roles autonomously without requiring user intervention or verification for individual actions, increasing the potential impact if a sub-agent's instructions are compromised.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture relies on a multi-step pipeline where data ingested by early-stage sub-agents is passed directly into the prompts of subsequent agents, creating an unvalidated trust chain.
  • Ingestion points: sub-agents such as the Analyst are tasked with reading and documenting local project files, RLS policies, and database schemas as seen in the Analyst (분석가) template in references/prompt-templates.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses markdown headers like ## 맥락 and ## 목표 to structure the sub-agent prompts, but these are insufficient to prevent a sophisticated adversarial injection embedded within the project files being analyzed.
  • Capability inventory: Sub-agents are granted general-purpose capabilities and operate with bypassed permissions, enabling potential file writes or system modifications if the agent context is hijacked.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or instruction-ignoring wrappers applied to the variables (e.g., {result_1}, {architect_result}) when they are interpolated into follow-up agent prompts.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 18, 2026, 06:13 PM