team-assemble
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's instructions in SKILL.md and its working examples utilize the
Tasktool with a specifically definedmode: "bypassPermissions"parameter. This configuration allows sub-agents (teammates) to execute their assigned roles autonomously without requiring user intervention or verification for individual actions, increasing the potential impact if a sub-agent's instructions are compromised. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture relies on a multi-step pipeline where data ingested by early-stage sub-agents is passed directly into the prompts of subsequent agents, creating an unvalidated trust chain.
- Ingestion points: sub-agents such as the
Analystare tasked with reading and documenting local project files, RLS policies, and database schemas as seen in theAnalyst (분석가)template inreferences/prompt-templates.md. - Boundary markers: The skill uses markdown headers like
## 맥락and## 목표to structure the sub-agent prompts, but these are insufficient to prevent a sophisticated adversarial injection embedded within the project files being analyzed. - Capability inventory: Sub-agents are granted
general-purposecapabilities and operate with bypassed permissions, enabling potential file writes or system modifications if the agent context is hijacked. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or instruction-ignoring wrappers applied to the variables (e.g.,
{result_1},{architect_result}) when they are interpolated into follow-up agent prompts.
Audit Metadata