openshell-cli

Warn

Audited by Snyk on Nov 20, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUM
Full Analysis

MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

  • Third-party content exposure detected (low risk: 0.10). The required runtime workflows are CLI commands run against the user's own gateway and sandboxes; the only path where outsider-influenced text plausibly reaches the agent is openshell logs during Workflow 4's denial monitoring, since denied-connection records include attacker-influenced destination hosts, but an outsider cannot post into that log stream directly and the agent must run the command.

MEDIUM W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

  • Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (medium risk: 0.30). The skill exposes operational mutations such as gateway registration, global policy and settings changes, provider and profile management, and sandbox deletion. Explicit irreversible loss is stated for sandbox delete --all, which removes retained state including storage ("Delete remains the operation that removes retained state", "Explicit delete can reclaim a sandbox ... including its storage"), and for suspended-sandbox memory state being discarded. Sandboxes are workspace-scoped resources on a remotely managed gateway, so scope is presumed shared, but the destruction scope is per sandbox. This makes it medium rather than high: no single operation joins irreversible loss with clearly shared infrastructure.

Issues (2)

W011
MEDIUM

Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

W013
MEDIUM

Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Nov 20, 2026, 07:24 PM
Issues
2