obsidian-qa-saver
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to invoke a Python script via the shell using arguments directly derived from user input, specifically
--folder,--title, and--tags. This presents a high risk of shell command injection if a user provides a title containing shell metacharacters (e.g., semicolons, backticks, or pipes), as the skill lacks instructions for sanitizing or escaping these inputs. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted conversation data and user-provided metadata to drive file system operations.
- Ingestion points: User conversation history and user-supplied strings for note metadata in SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: None identified; the instructions do not require the agent to wrap or delimit user input.
- Capability inventory: Execution of a local Python script via shell (
python scripts/save_to_obsidian.py) which interacts with the file system. - Sanitization: Absent; there are no instructions to escape shell characters or validate folder paths, increasing the risk of directory traversal or execution of unintended commands.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically constructs a shell command at runtime by interpolating user-provided strings into a command template. This pattern is inherently dangerous if the agent does not properly sanitize the resulting command string.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The core logic file
scripts/save_to_obsidian.pyis referenced throughout the skill documentation but is missing from the provided bundle. This prevents a security audit of the script's contents to ensure it does not contain malicious code or improper handling of file operations.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata