changeset-validation

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts/changeset-prompt.mjs script interpolates CLI arguments (--base, --head) directly into shell commands executed via execSync. This allows for arbitrary command execution if the arguments contain shell metacharacters.
  • Evidence: The run function calls execSync(cmd, ...) where cmd is constructed using ${headRef} and ${baseRef} in scripts/changeset-prompt.mjs.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from pull request bodies and git diffs, interpolating them into LLM prompts without sanitization or boundary markers. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: PR_BODY and PACKAGE_DIFF variables in scripts/changeset-prompt.mjs are sourced from the GitHub event payload and local git repository diffs.
  • Boundary markers: The prompt template in references/validation-prompt.md lacks delimiters or protective instructions for interpolated content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands via git, write to the file system, and interact with the GitHub API using a GITHUB_TOKEN.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation is performed on the pull request body or diff content before prompt construction.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Aug 6, 2026, 04:52 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — changeset-validation