changeset-validation
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/changeset-prompt.mjsscript interpolates CLI arguments (--base,--head) directly into shell commands executed viaexecSync. This allows for arbitrary command execution if the arguments contain shell metacharacters. - Evidence: The
runfunction callsexecSync(cmd, ...)wherecmdis constructed using${headRef}and${baseRef}inscripts/changeset-prompt.mjs. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from pull request bodies and git diffs, interpolating them into LLM prompts without sanitization or boundary markers. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points:
PR_BODYandPACKAGE_DIFFvariables inscripts/changeset-prompt.mjsare sourced from the GitHub event payload and local git repository diffs. - Boundary markers: The prompt template in
references/validation-prompt.mdlacks delimiters or protective instructions for interpolated content. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands via
git, write to the file system, and interact with the GitHub API using aGITHUB_TOKEN. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation is performed on the pull request body or diff content before prompt construction.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata