video-edit
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/jump_cut_vad_singlepass.pyutilizestorch.hub.loadto download and execute code from thesnakers4/silero-vadrepository on GitHub. This constitutes execution of remote code from a source that is not on the predefined trusted list. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: All scripts in the toolkit make extensive use of shell command execution via
subprocess.runto call external utilities includingffmpeg,ffprobe,yt-dlp, andnpx. This is found inscripts/auto_captions.py,scripts/compress_video.py,scripts/insert_3d_transition.py,scripts/jump_cut_vad_singlepass.py,scripts/simple_video_edit.py,scripts/vertical_crop.py, andscripts/youtube_clip.py. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs external downloads from various sources.
scripts/youtube_clip.pydownloads video files usingyt-dlp, andscripts/jump_cut_vad_singlepass.pydownloads the Silero VAD model and code from GitHub. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits data to external services.
scripts/simple_video_edit.pyandscripts/youtube_clip.pysend transcripts and video metadata toanthropic.comfor processing, andscripts/simple_video_edit.pyuploads video files toauphonic.com. These operations are consistent with the skill's stated purpose but involve the transfer of user data to third-party platforms. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection in
scripts/youtube_clip.pyandscripts/simple_video_edit.py, where external content is processed by an LLM. - Ingestion points: Transcripts generated from external YouTube videos or user-provided video files are used to populate prompts for Claude.
- Boundary markers: The prompts in
scripts/youtube_clip.pyandscripts/simple_video_edit.pydo not implement delimiters or instructions to ignore commands embedded within the transcript text. - Capability inventory: The skill has high local capabilities, including arbitrary command execution via FFmpeg and network access for data uploads.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the transcript content before it is processed by the AI model.
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