add-integration

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses sensitive local directories used for storing authentication data.
  • Evidence: Step 1 and Step 7 describe reading from and mapping credentials within ~/.claude-marketing/credentials/.
  • Evidence: Step 5 instructs the agent to guide users in storing secrets in .env files.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill executes code from external npm packages as part of its testing and configuration workflow.
  • Evidence: Step 3 generates configurations using npx to run packages directly from the npm registry.
  • Evidence: Step 6 performs a connectivity test by starting the MCP server and executing a "read-only operation" to verify authentication, which involves running arbitrary code from the third-party package.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources that could contain malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: Step 2 queries the npm registry and external MCP server directories for package metadata (descriptions, tool definitions).
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions are used to ignore embedded commands in the fetched package metadata.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands via npx, read/write local configuration files (.mcp.json), and access sensitive credential paths.
  • Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of the fetched package metadata is performed before displaying it to the user or incorporating it into configuration files.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs and suggests shell commands for execution.
  • Evidence: Steps 3 and 6 involve the use of npx and other startup commands to initialize and test the integration.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 16, 2026, 12:57 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — add-integration