brain-pdf

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several shell commands to manage its workflow, including mktemp for temporary file creation, sed for stripping YAML metadata, and gbrain for content retrieval.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: It invokes a local binary located at $HOME/.claude/skills/gstack/make-pdf/dist/pdf to perform the document rendering.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The invocation includes a CONTAINER=1 environment variable which disables the Chromium sandbox in the rendering engine (Playwright). While intended for container compatibility, this reduces the isolation between the rendering process and the host system.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the external gstack software package and suggests installing system-level font packages (fonts-liberation and fonts-noto-cjk) to ensure correct rendering.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing external Markdown data.\n
  • Ingestion points: Data is ingested from the brain repository via the gbrain get command in SKILL.md.\n
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to the model to ignore embedded commands within the processed Markdown.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill has permissions to read files and execute the rendering binary based on the ingested content.\n
  • Sanitization: While it removes frontmatter and mentions emoji sanitization, there is no comprehensive filtering of the Markdown body before it is passed to the PDF renderer.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 16, 2026, 01:05 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — brain-pdf