brain-pdf
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several shell commands to manage its workflow, including
mktempfor temporary file creation,sedfor stripping YAML metadata, andgbrainfor content retrieval.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: It invokes a local binary located at$HOME/.claude/skills/gstack/make-pdf/dist/pdfto perform the document rendering.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The invocation includes aCONTAINER=1environment variable which disables the Chromium sandbox in the rendering engine (Playwright). While intended for container compatibility, this reduces the isolation between the rendering process and the host system.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the externalgstacksoftware package and suggests installing system-level font packages (fonts-liberationandfonts-noto-cjk) to ensure correct rendering.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing external Markdown data.\n - Ingestion points: Data is ingested from the brain repository via the
gbrain getcommand inSKILL.md.\n - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to the model to ignore embedded commands within the processed Markdown.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has permissions to read files and execute the rendering binary based on the ingested content.\n
- Sanitization: While it removes frontmatter and mentions emoji sanitization, there is no comprehensive filtering of the Markdown body before it is passed to the PDF renderer.
Audit Metadata