recovering-from-ransomware-attack
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute high-privilege system commands for recovery purposes.
- Evidence: Use of
wbadminfor Active Directory restoration,Set-ADAccountPasswordfor credential resets, andStart-VBRInstantRecoveryfor virtual machine restoration inSKILL.md. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill contains hardcoded strings used as passwords in script examples.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdincludes strings like"NewKrbtgt2026!Complex#1"and"NewKrbtgt2026!Complex#2"within PowerShell commands meant for resetting the krbtgt account. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes an indirect prompt injection surface through the processing of untrusted external data during the forensic scan phase.
- Ingestion points: External backup data is mounted and scanned for artifacts at
/mnt/backup_verifyinSKILL.md(Step 3). - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no specific instructions or delimiters to isolate the output of scanning tools (
clamscan,find) when processed by the agent. - Capability inventory: The skill has extensive capabilities including shell command execution (
bash,powershell), file system modifications, and network operations via backup tools. - Sanitization: The skill uses the
noexecmount flag in Step 3, which prevents binary execution from the backup but does not mitigate prompt injection via log output parsing.
Audit Metadata