recovering-from-ransomware-attack

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute high-privilege system commands for recovery purposes.
  • Evidence: Use of wbadmin for Active Directory restoration, Set-ADAccountPassword for credential resets, and Start-VBRInstantRecovery for virtual machine restoration in SKILL.md.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill contains hardcoded strings used as passwords in script examples.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md includes strings like "NewKrbtgt2026!Complex#1" and "NewKrbtgt2026!Complex#2" within PowerShell commands meant for resetting the krbtgt account.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes an indirect prompt injection surface through the processing of untrusted external data during the forensic scan phase.
  • Ingestion points: External backup data is mounted and scanned for artifacts at /mnt/backup_verify in SKILL.md (Step 3).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no specific instructions or delimiters to isolate the output of scanning tools (clamscan, find) when processed by the agent.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has extensive capabilities including shell command execution (bash, powershell), file system modifications, and network operations via backup tools.
  • Sanitization: The skill uses the noexec mount flag in Step 3, which prevents binary execution from the backup but does not mitigate prompt injection via log output parsing.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 16, 2026, 01:00 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — recovering-from-ransomware-attack