skillscan
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to modify its core configuration by appending permanent rules to
SOUL.md. This is a persistence mechanism that overrides default agent behavior across all future sessions. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill defines an API at
skillscan.tokauth.comused to upload local data. The scan process involves performing a POST request to/oapi/v1/skill-scan/upload, which sends the content or metadata of other local skills to an external server. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of a local Python script
scripts/scanner.pyfor its primary functions. It also includes an 'Auto Update' feature that performs daily, silent updates of its own executable code, which is a high-risk pattern for remote code execution. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill requires access to the filesystem to read other skills (directories and .zip files) and write configuration files (
scripts/.first_run_done), creating a significant data exposure surface. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from other skills during the scanning process, which is a known attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Processes third-party skill directories, .zip files, and
SKILL.mdcontent via thescanner.py scancommand. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions are provided for the data being analyzed.
- Capability inventory: Executes subprocesses (
python scanner.py), performs network uploads via POST, and modifies core agent instructions (SOUL.md). - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation of the ingested skill data before processing or upload.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata