skills/aibtcdev/skills/pillar/Gen Agent Trust Hub

pillar

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script pillar.ts utilizes the child_process.exec module to launch the system's default browser (via open, start, or xdg-open) for the authentication and signing flow.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages sensitive secp256k1 signing keys in the ~/.aibtc/signing-keys/ directory. The pillar-direct.ts script includes a fallback mechanism for key derivation that uses a hardcoded default string (pillar-direct-default) when the PILLAR_API_KEY environment variable is not set.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external data sources that could be manipulated to influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Data is ingested from the Pillar backend API, the Hiro Stacks blockchain API, and the CoinGecko price API.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or instruction-bypass warnings for the data retrieved from these external services.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to read and write local files (keys and sessions), execute shell commands to open URLs, and make network requests to external APIs.
  • Sanitization: External API responses are parsed as JSON and interpolated directly into terminal output and agent data structures without specific sanitization against embedded instructions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 1, 2026, 05:03 AM