pillar
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
pillar.tsutilizes thechild_process.execmodule to launch the system's default browser (viaopen,start, orxdg-open) for the authentication and signing flow. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages sensitive secp256k1 signing keys in the
~/.aibtc/signing-keys/directory. Thepillar-direct.tsscript includes a fallback mechanism for key derivation that uses a hardcoded default string (pillar-direct-default) when thePILLAR_API_KEYenvironment variable is not set. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external data sources that could be manipulated to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested from the Pillar backend API, the Hiro Stacks blockchain API, and the CoinGecko price API.
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or instruction-bypass warnings for the data retrieved from these external services.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to read and write local files (keys and sessions), execute shell commands to open URLs, and make network requests to external APIs.
- Sanitization: External API responses are parsed as JSON and interpolated directly into terminal output and agent data structures without specific sanitization against embedded instructions.
Audit Metadata