sbtc-yield-maximizer
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates a temporary JavaScript wrapper file at runtime within the system's temporary directory. This wrapper is then executed via Bun to bridge wallet credentials to the
hodlmm-move-liquiditytool, usingimport()on a script path resolved from environment variables.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script invokes external CLI tools viaBun.spawn. Specifically, it executes thehodlmm-move-liquiditycommand, with the target binary or script path determined by theHODLMM_MOVE_LIQUIDITY_CMDenvironment variable or system PATH resolution.\n- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill extracts the wallet's sensitive private key (stxPrivateKey) and exposes it to subprocesses by setting theSTACKS_PRIVATE_KEYenvironment variable. This method of credential passing can potentially leak secrets through environment logging, process inspection, or unintended inheritance by other child processes.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from multiple Bitflow API endpoints to determine yield routing, which could be manipulated to influence agent behavior or capital allocation.\n - Ingestion points: Fetches pool metadata, quotes, and bin data from
bff.bitflowapis.finance.\n - Boundary markers: The agent is instructed to use
doctorandstatuscommands to manually verify decisions, and the code implements safety gates for TVL, volume, and price divergence.\n - Capability inventory: Possesses the ability to write to the blockchain (
zest.supply) and execute arbitrary local commands (Bun.spawn).\n - Sanitization: The skill performs numeric conversion and comparison against defined thresholds but does not strictly sanitize the string-based API content before internal processing or output to the agent context.
Audit Metadata