Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external PDF documents to extract text, tables, and form metadata, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in a PDF could attempt to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: PDF content is ingested via
pypdf,pdfplumber, andpdf2imageacross multiple scripts includingextract_form_field_info.pyandconvert_pdf_to_images.py. - Boundary markers: The skill uses structured JSON formats (
field_info.json,fields.json) to isolate extracted data, and theforms.mdinstructions include mandatory validation steps (check_bounding_boxes.pyand visual image inspection) to verify output integrity. - Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to write PDF and image files and execute localized Python scripts to perform document manipulation.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of explicit sanitization of extracted PDF text before it is returned to the agent context.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyperforms dynamic execution by monkeypatching thepypdf.generic.DictionaryObject.get_inheritedmethod at runtime. This is a targeted implementation intended to fix a specific bug in the library's handling of selection lists and does not execute arbitrary user input. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The main skill instructions (
SKILL.md) and advanced reference (reference.md) provide examples for using standard command-line PDF utilities includingpdftotext,qpdf,pdftk, andpdftoppmfor document manipulation.
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