zitadel-api
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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill provides explicit instructions and commands to extract administrative credentials, including Personal Access Tokens (PAT) and Private Key JWTs, from Kubernetes secrets (
iam-admin-pat,iam-admin-jwt).\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill contains commands that usekubectl execto perform direct SQL queries against the ZITADEL PostgreSQL database, specifically targeting application client IDs and client secrets (projections.apps7_oidc_configs).\n- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill requires and demonstrates the use of high-privilege Kubernetes operations (reading secrets across namespaces and executing commands inside pods) to perform management tasks.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: A Python script for signing JWT assertions is dynamically generated and executed via a shell heredoc, using thejwtlibrary.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a broad attack surface for indirect prompt injection. It ingests untrusted data such as organization names, project names, and user profiles, which are then interpolated directly into shell-basedcurlcommands without evident sanitization. This is documented across multiple files including the creation of organizations, projects, and users.
Audit Metadata