pr-comments
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data in the form of PR/MR comments, which can be used to deliver malicious instructions to the agent.
- Ingestion points: The agent fetches comment content from GitHub, GitLab, and Azure DevOps via
gh,glab, andazCLI tools as described in SKILL.md and reference.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or clear separation markers (like XML tags or headers) to distinguish between fetched comment text and system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell command execution for SCM CLIs and repository metadata reading via git commands.
- Sanitization: There is no instruction to sanitize, filter, or escape the content of the comments before they are processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing local system commands to interact with source control providers.
- Evidence: The skill instructs the agent to run commands like
git remote get-url origin,gh pr view --comments, andglab mr view --commentsto retrieve pull request information. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides guidance for installing official CLI tools from well-known technology providers.
- Evidence: reference.md lists installation commands such as
brew install ghfor GitHub,brew install glabfor GitLab, andbrew install azure-clifor Microsoft Azure DevOps. - Neutral context: The skill enforces a security best practice by requiring the agent to notify the user and obtain explicit permission before executing any installation commands.
Audit Metadata