aikido-mcp-comments
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources without adequate safeguards against malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches pull and merge request comments from GitHub, GitLab, and Azure DevOps (documented in
SKILL.mdandreference.md). - Boundary markers: There are no instructions to use delimiters or to warn the agent to ignore any instructions embedded within the fetched comments.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
gh,glab, andazcommand-line interfaces to interact with remote repositories. - Sanitization: There is no filtering or sanitization of the comment content before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs shell commands using user-supplied parameters without explicit validation or sanitization instructions.
- Instructions in
SKILL.mdandreference.mddirect the agent to interpolate user-provided values, such as repository names, organization URLs, and PR/MR numbers, into shell commands (e.g.,gh pr view <number> --repo org/repo). - While the agent is responsible for the execution, the lack of sanitization guidelines for these inputs represents a potential command injection surface.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and suggests the installation of official command-line tools from well-known services.
- It provides instructions for installing the GitHub CLI (
gh), GitLab CLI (glab), and Azure CLI (az) via official domains and the Homebrew package manager (reference.md). - The skill follows best practices by instructing the agent to never install these tools without explicit user permission (
SKILL.md).
Audit Metadata