aikido-mcp-comments

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 3, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources without adequate safeguards against malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: The skill fetches pull and merge request comments from GitHub, GitLab, and Azure DevOps (documented in SKILL.md and reference.md).
  • Boundary markers: There are no instructions to use delimiters or to warn the agent to ignore any instructions embedded within the fetched comments.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses the gh, glab, and az command-line interfaces to interact with remote repositories.
  • Sanitization: There is no filtering or sanitization of the comment content before it is processed by the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs shell commands using user-supplied parameters without explicit validation or sanitization instructions.
  • Instructions in SKILL.md and reference.md direct the agent to interpolate user-provided values, such as repository names, organization URLs, and PR/MR numbers, into shell commands (e.g., gh pr view <number> --repo org/repo).
  • While the agent is responsible for the execution, the lack of sanitization guidelines for these inputs represents a potential command injection surface.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and suggests the installation of official command-line tools from well-known services.
  • It provides instructions for installing the GitHub CLI (gh), GitLab CLI (glab), and Azure CLI (az) via official domains and the Homebrew package manager (reference.md).
  • The skill follows best practices by instructing the agent to never install these tools without explicit user permission (SKILL.md).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 3, 2026, 05:42 PM