pentest-agent-os
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill explicitly mandates an 'unlimited-attack-scope' (不设限原则) and instructs the agent to 'not pre-set fixed paths/roles/known exploit chains.' This represents a directive to ignore standard safety constraints and operational boundaries in favor of autonomous offensive actions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The framework defines 'Mandatory Behavior Triggers' (强制行为触发器) that instruct the agent to execute full command sequences from associated skills (e.g., '执行 component-vuln-intel 全部命令') for vulnerability assessment and tool bootstrapping ('proxy-tool-bootstrap').
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill map includes components specifically designed for 'post-exploitation/privilege escalation' (提权) and 'credential cracking' (凭据破解), indicating a core capability for unauthorized privilege acquisition.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The agent is designed to perform autonomous reconnaissance and intelligence gathering (via
attack-surface-reconandcomponent-vuln-intel), which involves processing untrusted data from external targets. - Ingestion points: Target intelligence, network reconnaissance data, and identified service metadata processed by linked skills.
- Boundary markers: None identified in the framework index or instructional logic.
- Capability inventory: Full-chain attack capabilities, binary reversing, privilege escalation, and 0day discovery mechanisms across the suite.
- Sanitization: There are no instructions for sanitizing or validating content retrieved from external targets before processing it through the LLM.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata