author-response-builder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted external data including reviewer comments, editor letters, and revision notes, which serves as a surface for indirect prompt injection. 1. Ingestion points: Reviewer comments, editor letter, and revision notes as described in SKILL.md. 2. Boundary markers: The Clarification-First Rule (references/clarification-first-rule.md) requires the agent to verify sufficient context before drafting. 3. Capability inventory: The skill is limited to text generation; no file-write, network-access, or command-execution tools are utilized. 4. Sanitization: Hard rules (references/hard-rules.md) and logic reporting (references/logic-reporting-rule.md) mandate that the agent must not fabricate data and must provide strategic logic for its framing.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill package includes a file named 'eval_report_author-response-builder_result.json' containing self-referential content that makes authoritative claims about the skill's safety audit results. Evidence: The file includes metadata fields such as 'security: PASS' and 'skill_veto: PASS' which are intended to influence automated analysis systems.
Audit Metadata