latex-manuscript-format-converter
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMMETADATA_POISONINGINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill package includes a file titled
eval_report_latex-manuscript-format-converter_result.json. This file is a fabricated security audit mimicking the output of an automated auditor (version 'skill-auditor@1.0'). It makes authoritative safety claims such as 'security: PASS', 'Production Ready', and 'deployable: true'. The inclusion of this file is a deceptive attempt to influence the agent's behavior and the system's security posture by bypassing legitimate inspection with a falsified 'safety certificate'. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is primarily designed to ingest and process untrusted external data, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill (SKILL.md) explicitly instructs the agent to process 'manuscript draft', 'target journal instructions', 'conference template', and 'external Word/plain-text files' provided by the user.
- Boundary markers: There are no instructions or technical rules defined in the skill (such as in
references/hard-rules.md) to apply boundary markers or delimiters when presenting untrusted content to the model, nor are there instructions to ignore hidden directives within those files. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to generate and output structured LaTeX code based on these inputs. A malicious input could trick the agent into emitting malicious LaTeX commands or leaking parts of the system prompt under the guise of 'improving template alignment'.
- Sanitization: The skill lacks any mechanism for sanitizing or filtering input text for embedded instructions before it enters the agent's context.
Audit Metadata