litbase
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requests broad shell permissions via
settings.local.json, includingBash(chmod +x:*),Bash(curl:*), andBash(python:*). These permissions are utilized for environment initialization and for running the internal Python scripts provided with the skill. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted data from external academic PDFs and bibliographic APIs to generate notes and synthesize research proposals.
- Ingestion points:
commands/read.md(reading PDF content) andcommands/feed.md(fetching metadata from Semantic Scholar). - Boundary markers: The instructions for processing external content do not include explicit delimiters or warnings to the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the papers or metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write to the file system, perform network operations, and execute subprocesses through its utility scripts.
- Sanitization:
scripts/rename_pdfs.pyapplies regex filtering when generating filenames from metadata, but no explicit sanitization is used for text content interpolated into agent prompts during note generation. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches academic data from established and well-known services.
- Evidence: Metadata queries are directed to
api.semanticscholar.org(Semantic Scholar) andapi.crossref.org(CrossRef).
Audit Metadata