meta-screening-fulltext
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The Workflow section in SKILL.md instructs the agent to execute shell commands using unvalidated user input:
python scripts/query_pubmed.py "<input_pmid>". This pattern is vulnerable to command injection if the input_pmid provided by a user contains shell metacharacters (e.g., semicolons, pipes, or backticks), potentially allowing arbitrary command execution on the host environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted external content from medical papers and metadata retrieved from PubMed to perform its screening tasks. \n- Ingestion points: The
input_papervariable (full text) and Title/Abstract metadata fetched viascripts/query_pubmed.py. \n- Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or 'ignore instructions' wrappers for the external paper data, increasing the risk that the agent might follow malicious instructions embedded within a paper. \n- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell-based scripts (scripts/extract_pdf.pyandscripts/query_pubmed.py) which provide a significant impact surface if an injection occurs. \n- Sanitization: No input validation or sanitization routines are defined for the paper text or the PMID variable before they are processed by tools or the LLM.
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