esmfold2
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs software packages directly from external GitHub repositories (github.com/Biohub/transformers and github.com/Biohub/esm) rather than exclusively from the official PyPI registry. This is a common practice for research models to include specific patches or features required for specialized performance.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill implementation includes a monkeypatch for
torch.linalg.svdto ensure numerical stability when running on GPU hardware. This involves dynamically overriding a standard library function at runtime to redirect specific calculations to the CPU when degenerate inputs are detected. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill requires network egress to communicate with HuggingFace Hub for downloading model weights and accesses the Biohub API (
biohub.ai) to retrieve feature metadata for ESMC models. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted biological sequence data (Protein, DNA, RNA, SMILES) which enters the agent context via
StructurePredictionInput, presenting a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks. - Ingestion points: The
StructurePredictionInputsequence fields and MSA file loading (MSA.from_a3m) inSKILL.mdserve as points where external data enters the environment. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands were identified for the sequence inputs.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write local files (e.g.,
best.complex.to_mmcif()) and perform network operations to HuggingFace and the Biohub API. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or validation of the biological sequence content (beyond standard model processing) was identified.
Audit Metadata