figure-composer

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script test_kernel.py uses exec() to evaluate Python code snippets extracted from generated prompt strings using regular expressions. This practice allows for the execution of dynamically constructed code that incorporates external inputs, posing a risk if the generation logic or the input data is compromised.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted inputs, such as user-defined claims and panel descriptions, and interpolates them into instructions for sub-agents without sufficient isolation or sanitization.\n
  • Ingestion points: The claim and dataVersionIds inputs in SKILL.md, and the message and ask fields in the panel outline generated and used by kernel.py.\n
  • Boundary markers: External content is placed inside markdown blockquotes (> ) within the prompts for sub-agents, which provides only minimal protection against malicious instructions embedded in the data.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill and its delegated sub-agents have the ability to execute code in a Python kernel (notebook_execute), manage project artifacts, and write files to the system via write_artifact_file.\n
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of escaping or sanitizing the strings provided by the user or external data sources before they are included in the prompt templates.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes notebook_execute and repl_execute to perform its core functions, enabling the execution of arbitrary Python code in the kernel and the management of sub-agent processes.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 30, 2026, 12:40 AM