figure-composer
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
test_kernel.pyusesexec()to evaluate Python code snippets extracted from generated prompt strings using regular expressions. This practice allows for the execution of dynamically constructed code that incorporates external inputs, posing a risk if the generation logic or the input data is compromised.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted inputs, such as user-defined claims and panel descriptions, and interpolates them into instructions for sub-agents without sufficient isolation or sanitization.\n - Ingestion points: The
claimanddataVersionIdsinputs inSKILL.md, and themessageandaskfields in the panel outline generated and used bykernel.py.\n - Boundary markers: External content is placed inside markdown blockquotes (
>) within the prompts for sub-agents, which provides only minimal protection against malicious instructions embedded in the data.\n - Capability inventory: The skill and its delegated sub-agents have the ability to execute code in a Python kernel (
notebook_execute), manage project artifacts, and write files to the system viawrite_artifact_file.\n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of escaping or sanitizing the strings provided by the user or external data sources before they are included in the prompt templates.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes
notebook_executeandrepl_executeto perform its core functions, enabling the execution of arbitrary Python code in the kernel and the management of sub-agent processes.
Audit Metadata