paper-narrative

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data (manuscripts, abstracts, and captions) and interpolates them directly into LLM prompts within its JavaScript control-plane logic.
  • Ingestion points: The variables manuscriptText, abstractText, and captionsText are loaded from Artifact Versions and concatenated into the prompt string in SKILL.md (Step 1).
  • Boundary markers: The prompt construction lacks explicit delimiters (such as XML-style tags or structured barriers) to separate the system instructions from the potentially adversarial content within the manuscript text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute code via notebook_execute, delegate tasks to other skills using host.delegate, and write new project artifacts.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, filtering, or instruction-override warnings are applied to the input text before it is sent to the model.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes platform-specific execution capabilities to perform its tasks.
  • SKILL.md documents the use of notebook_execute to call deterministic Python functions defined in kernel.py (e.g., paper_brief_schema).
  • The JavaScript logic uses host.delegate and host.collect to manage child agent workflows, which is an expected but powerful capability for workflow orchestration.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 30, 2026, 12:41 AM