paper-narrative
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data (manuscripts, abstracts, and captions) and interpolates them directly into LLM prompts within its JavaScript control-plane logic.
- Ingestion points: The variables
manuscriptText,abstractText, andcaptionsTextare loaded from Artifact Versions and concatenated into thepromptstring inSKILL.md(Step 1). - Boundary markers: The prompt construction lacks explicit delimiters (such as XML-style tags or structured barriers) to separate the system instructions from the potentially adversarial content within the manuscript text.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute code via
notebook_execute, delegate tasks to other skills usinghost.delegate, and write new project artifacts. - Sanitization: No sanitization, filtering, or instruction-override warnings are applied to the input text before it is sent to the model.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes platform-specific execution capabilities to perform its tasks.
SKILL.mddocuments the use ofnotebook_executeto call deterministic Python functions defined inkernel.py(e.g.,paper_brief_schema).- The JavaScript logic uses
host.delegateandhost.collectto manage child agent workflows, which is an expected but powerful capability for workflow orchestration.
Audit Metadata