self-awareness
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines procedures for the agent to ingest conversation transcripts and project metadata, which could contain instructions designed to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points:
host.frames.get(retrieves transcript messages),host.artifacts(retrieves filenames and user upload metadata), andhost.sessions.list(retrieves session titles). - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not provide specific instructions to the agent on how to differentiate between legitimate data and embedded instructions within these sources.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
repl_executeto invoke thehostAPI, which has capabilities for file path resolution (host.artifactPath), compute management (host.compute), and messaging (host.sendFrameMessage). - Sanitization: Absent. While the documentation mentions "sanitized runtime segment projections," this does not prevent the agent from interpreting the content of messages or metadata as commands.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of JavaScript code snippets within a control REPL to interact with the host environment.
- Patterns: The instructions provide various code templates for the agent to use with the
repl_executetool, such asawait host.capabilities()andawait host.lineage.graph(versionId).
Audit Metadata