agent-browser
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill exposes an
executefunction designed to run arbitrary JavaScript code on the targeted web pages. While this is a core feature for web automation and data extraction, it allows the agent to execute unverified logic in a remote browser environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation instructs users to install the
belt-sh/clitool usingnpxand references a setup script hosted atraw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/. These are required components for the skill's functionality. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to run thebeltCLI, which serves as the interface for all browser interactions. Documentation also suggests usingoathtoolfor TOTP generation in authentication scripts (references/authentication.md). - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes capabilities to extract browser cookies, session data, and page content (text, screenshots, video). These features are intended for web scraping and session persistence but allow for the retrieval of sensitive information from the browser context.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests untrusted data from web pages.
- Ingestion points: Page titles, body text, and element descriptions are retrieved via the
open,snapshot, andexecutefunctions (SKILL.md, references/commands.md). - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement delimiters or safety warnings for the ingested content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for element interaction (click, fill), JavaScript execution, and file uploads across all automation scripts (references/commands.md).
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or sanitization of external content before it is returned to the agent context.
Audit Metadata