agentic-workflow
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 27, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONSAFE
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection attack surface because it instructs the agent to process untrusted external data, such as pull request changes and codebase structures.
- Ingestion points: The PR review and Git workflow sections in
SKILL.mdinvolve reading external code and metadata. - Boundary markers: The provided instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions in the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Read,Write, andBashtools, which could be leveraged if an injection is successful. - Sanitization: No explicit content filtering or validation is described in the workflows.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Instructions in
SKILL.md(line 214) demonstrate downloading and executing an installation script fromhttps://claude.ai/install.sh. This reference targets the official domain of a well-known service associated with a trusted organization. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill contains various shell command examples for productivity, including Git worktree management, session handling, and Docker orchestration. These are presented as educational content to guide user workflow optimization.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: A Docker usage example in
SKILL.md(line 225) includes forwarding theANTHROPIC_API_KEYenvironment variable to a container. This follows standard development practices for managing secrets through environment variables rather than hardcoded values.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://claude.ai/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata