agentix-ceo
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 27, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs the agent to create and manage a hidden credentials file at
~/.agentix/credentials. This file is used to store high-value plaintext secrets, including Agentix API keys, customer IDs, and team identifiers. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill explicitly directs the agent to solicit sensitive third-party credentials from the user, specifically Anthropic API keys and GitHub personal access tokens. These secrets are then transmitted via network requests to an external service (
agentix.cloud) for storage and use by remote workers. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a pattern for Indirect Prompt Injection by fetching a 'playbook' from a remote API (
$AGENTIX_API/teams/$TEAM_ID/playbook). This remote data is used to define the agent's 'operating mode, policies, and custom rules'. - Ingestion points: Remote content is fetched from the Agentix API and loaded into the agent's context during the initialization of every session.
- Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the fetched playbook text.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to create roles, manage tasks, spawn remote workers, and interact with GitHub repositories if configured.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation performed on the remote playbook content before it is adopted as the agent's operating policy.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides examples of shell commands used for environment setup and credential management, including the use of
catwith heredocs to write secrets to the filesystem.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata