ai-automation-workflows
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 27, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Found in
SKILL.mdat line 21, the commandcurl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | shdownloads a script from a remote server and executes it directly through the shell. This pattern is a critical security vulnerability as it permits arbitrary code execution without auditing the remote script.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides templates to establish persistence on the host machine. It instructs the user to modify the crontab usingcrontab -eand provides multiple examples of scheduled tasks for recurring execution (SKILL.md, lines 188-200).- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Themonitored_workflow.shtemplate (SKILL.md, lines 269-282) describes a mechanism to capture command strings and captured error output into a variable, which is then sent to an external webhook (https://your-webhook.com/alert) via a POST request. This is a potential channel for exfiltrating sensitive execution data.- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Thedata_processing.shscript (SKILL.md, lines 364-377) reads local files and interpolates their contents into a prompt for an external AI provider. Ingestion point:$(cat $file)at line 375. Boundary markers: Absent. Capability inventory: Filesystem access, command execution, and network transmission. Sanitization: Absent.- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: In the "Related Skills" section (SKILL.md, lines 393-402), the skill promotes the installation of external code by suggesting the use ofnpx skills addto fetch and integrate additional skills from theinference-shrepository.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The workflow for data processing (SKILL.md, lines 364-377) is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it reads raw local file data directly into a prompt template without using delimiters or sanitization. This allows malicious instructions within the files to potentially override the agent's behavior.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: There is a potential for deceptive metadata. While the skill author is listed asaiskillstore, the internal report and source URLs attribute the content toinference-sh, which may mislead users about the origin and accountability of the skill code.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata