lark-base
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill enables the agent to read and process data from external Lark Base tables using commands such as
+record-listand+record-get. This ingested content could potentially contain malicious instructions intended to influence the agent's behavior during subsequent tasks, such as automated record creation or workflow configuration. - Ingestion points: Table data retrieved via
+record-list,+record-get, and+record-search(documented inlark-base-data-analysis-sop.md). - Boundary markers: Instructions mention using delimiters for external content in the remediation section, but the skill's primary command set does not enforce boundary markers for ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The skill can modify tables, create workflows with network capabilities (
HTTPClientAction), and manage user permissions usinglark-cli. - Sanitization: Instructions advise using explicit confirmation flags (
--i-have-read-guide,--yes) for high-risk operations, but the underlying data processing lacks specific structural sanitization against adversarial prompt injection. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
lark-clisystem binary to execute administrative and data operations. While these are legitimate functionalities for a Lark management tool, they provide extensive control over the user's document environment, including the ability to manage advanced permissions and automated tasks.
Audit Metadata