skill-writer
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The file
skill-report.jsoncontains deceptive metadata, including an author name ("Dami-Randle") that contradicts the expected author context ("aiskillstore") and references to non-existent AI models ("gpt-5.5"). It also makes self-referential safety claims ("risk_level": "safe", "Verdict: SAFE") which attempt to override independent security analysis. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the generation of other skills based on untrusted user input, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: User-provided skill descriptions, requirements, and trigger words used in Step 1 and Step 6 of the
SKILL.mdinstructions. - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not instruct the agent to use delimiters or specific warnings to ignore embedded instructions when incorporating user data into generated skill files.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides instructions for performing file system operations (like
mkdir) and generating functional agent instructions. - Sanitization: Absent; there is no guidance on validating, filtering, or escaping user-provided strings before they are inserted into the frontmatter or body of a new
SKILL.mdfile. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation includes several examples of shell commands for directory management (
mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills/), file inspection (ls,cat), and dependency management (pip install package-name). These are legitimate educational examples provided within the context of the skill's purpose as an authoring guide.
Audit Metadata