xiaohongshu-search
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The file
lib/key.jscontains a hardcoded default API tokene10adc3949ba59abbe56e057f20f883eused as a fallback when theGUAIKEI_API_TOKENenvironment variable is not provided. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes network requests to
www.guaikei.comto fetch Xiaohongshu note data and metadata. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/search.jsperforms filesystem operations, including creating and deleting lock files (.lock_${taskId}) and saving search results tolast-search.jsonwithin the skill's directory. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted content from the Xiaohongshu API and interpolates it into Markdown output without sanitization or boundary markers.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the system via API responses from
www.guaikei.cominlib/xiaohongshu.js. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or 'ignore instructions' warnings are used in
xiaohongshu.formatMessagewhen preparing the Markdown output. - Capability inventory: The skill has filesystem write access (
fs.writeFileSync) and network access via thehttpsmodule. - Sanitization: While search keywords are sanitized, the content retrieved from the external API (titles, nicknames, etc.) is not sanitized before being rendered to the user or agent context.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata